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Il: TliE SUPP.HIE COUP,T OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
·M ,\:;1y 1:J1.T:0t::.L rnsur""r:cE 
'.'t1,\:'.Y' 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
OCC FIRE i'.l:D CASUALTY 
Defendant-Appellant. 
tJo. 18964 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPOEDEUT 
tlATUirn OF TllE CASE 
This is a declaratory action to deteruine which 
conpany provided prinary coverage the claio asserted for person-
d injuries in Hm.1croft v. Bisel, Civil tlo. 78-5021. The Eowcroft 
suit was settled out of court for a total sun of $150,000.00. 
Guaranty National Insurance Company paid its policy limits under 
protest and Occidental Fire and Casualty Company paid the balance of 
the settleoent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both parties filed motions for sumnary judgoent based on 
stipulated facts. The Honorable Phillip R. Fishler, Third Judicial 
Cuurt, grar.ted pli!intiff's ootion and held the Occidental Fire and 
Casualty p•.'J lC' 
Bise:;_ as 
sunnJr:/ judgnl'nt. 
p -;._- n, t L. ': , :c: :: L- r ·- ; 1 t p l P j n · ; • I ' , • r , 1 L _ 
r'.E'...I EF SGUClcT or: P.F'PEAL 
Plo.intiff-Lespcnde:tt, Guaranty i 1cttional Insur,Jncc 
seeks to have the lower court judgoent aifiroed. 
ISSUES 
1. \Thether princiry cover2ge for a tractor-trJ.:..lcr u'"._ 
lease, driven bv the mmer-lessor, is provided bu the insurer 
the lessor or that of the lessee. 
\i'hether in a declaratory actio;-i bet\leen tun 
coopanies, after the injured third-partv's clain has been satiE 
I.C.C. regulations negate the insurance contract provisions o: 
whether ge;ieral insurance contract principles are deterninctive 
coverage. 
FACTS 
On July 17, 1978 Dclov Bisel drove hjs Intcn1ation.": 
tractor and duop trailer into an intersection 2'.1d ccillidc'l\ i;;I 
autonobilc driven by llrs. Brenda lioucroft. P..s ;_i :-csult t't 1 , 
accident, tirs. Howcroft and her tuo childreil 1Jc:re injured. ,\t 
'Ile ciccident, tir. Bisel and his truck 'Jere under lease to 
.cl 1c«1nsportatio01 Conpanv. (P .. 91-92) 
Bisel and his trcictor-trailer were insured under an 
1 c.:ci0cntai Fire and Casualty Conpany policy nunber CA 21-57-74 
in 1977, uhich ''as in effect on July 17, 1978. That policy 
cunlicins the following pertinent provisions and endorsenents. 
INSURrnG AGREEliENTS 
III. Definition of Insured: 
(a) \Jith respect to the insurance 
for bodily injury liability, the unqual-
ified word "insured" includes the naoed 
insured and ... any person or organiz-
ation legally responsible for the use 
thereof, provided the actual use or the 
autonobile is by the named insured or 
such spouse or with the pernission of 
either. (R. 7) 
LONGHAUL TRUCK11EN ENDORSEMENT 
3. Other Insurance: \Jith respect to any 
automobile of the coomercial type uhile 
leased or loaned to an; person or orgau-
iza tion, other than the naoed insured, 
engaged in the business of transporting 
property by automobile for others, or any 
hired private passenger automobile insur-
ed on the "cost of hire" basis, or any 
non-owned automobile, this insurance 
shall be excess over any other valid and 
collectible insurance. (R. 13) (enphasis added) 
On July 17, 1978, Norwood Transportation was insured under 
an autonobile liability policy nunber GLA 0022857 issued by Guaranty 
tlational Insurance CoEip;:my. That policy contains the follouing 
pPrtinent provisions and endorsenents: 
PERSOtlS rnsur,ED . . . 
a) The named insured; 
b) Any partner or executive officer 
thereof 
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c) An'r other person 1vh'.1c: 1::;;n'.'. "' 
CH·J11t:' d ,jut Ot:iu 1.J :_ l L' (' r d t 'i-:. ',' l; J -
sr:_tutL 11it/1 t c· 11[ 
01 ri.Jr.icJ 1 J) 
TP.l'Ct'.:1Li 
2.) 
b) providc:d, hm1ever, a ur 
other person '.'urnishcd to the n.21;1cd in-
with ar ctUt0nobilc hi:·ecl the 
nancd insured shall be deencd to be 
an enplovee of Ehc naned inaurcd. 
cl) 1:ith respect to (1) (2) 
(3) any non-o,,.med autonohile, the in-
surance under this endorsement shall 
be excess insurance over anv other valid 
and col:ectible insurance, \1hether pri-
mary, eYcess or contingent, fiVailable 
to the insured. (emphasis added, P.. '.'.9) 
POillT I 
t;E:::THER THE I. C. C. REGULATIOUS OR EtlDOP,SEhFJiTS tiOL 
THEIR UllDERLYI!;c PUBLIC POLICY tlEGATE THE PP.OVISIOt:s 
OF THE rnsURA!lCE POLICIES rn THIS CASE. 
At the tine of the Bisel-Howcroft collision Appellant 
conbination automobile policy number CA 21-57-75, purchased bv 
Bisel in 1977, was in full force and effect. Bisel purchased t'. 
policy to cover his tractor-trailer and liability arising 
use. In the suit that arose from the Bisel-Howcroft accident, 
Appellant refused to defend and cover Bisel except to provic'e e·· 
coverage. 
In Utah, the courts h2ve tr2.ditionall•1 held that rr:· 
coverage is provided by the vehicle 01mer' s policy covcrinz the 
4 
Llntional Faroer's Propertv and Casualtv Co. vs. 
,, _bsurar,c<e Grouu, 14 Utah2d 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963); 
i,:-:c-tL!lc;c:n v. Faroers :nsurance Exchange, 21 Utah2d 194, 443 P.2d 
105 ( 1968). Judge Fishler, 3n experienced insurance lawyer hinself, 
rc:cognized the Utah position in holding Appellant's policy prioary. 
Appellant seeks r.ow to circuovent the Utah principle and 
the risks it specifically contracted to insure, to Respondent. 
That would result i'1 forcing Respondc=nt to cover Bisel, whor;i it 
contracted to exclude. Such a result is contrary not only 
to the recognized Utah position regarding prioary coverage, but also 
the public policy of freedoo to contract 2.llocate risks which 
underlies all contract lau. 
The issue of prir;iary versus excess coverage in truck-lease 
situations is one which has been frequently litigated and as Appel-
lant points out in its brief, has given rise to two distinct legal 
theories. Appellant cites Transport Indeonity Co. v. Carolina 
Casualtv Co., 652 P.2d 134 (Ariz. 1982) as the better reasoned posi-
tion, holding the lessee's insurance policy priaary because the 
required I.C.C. endorseaent nullified the excess provision that 
otherwise oay have relieved Transport Indeanity of liability. The 
Transport case can and should be distinguished on a crucial fact. 
Tl1ere the parties had been unable to reach an agreement as to who 
1Jould defend acid settle the underlying tort clail'.l prior to filing 
their declaratory action. It is that specific situation that the 
I.C.C. regulations at issue here, were intended to prevent. In the 
5 
t:1._Y;:.-t i_r·c· l pcd i1.2· li:--1i :._ 'uL". '-1r\..'. : L.:l: prt:> 
Jccldr2tory 2ction. 
On these ::1ci;_-s, c_:.. have he. 
I.C.C. rcgulatiur;s policy prt_.-v::_:;i_,H-:s only in disputL 
b et1.112c1-:. insu:-2r s th'2 o: the spec i :f i c po 1 ic:r provis ior 
govern. PJcific [:(1cicn2l Insurarccc Cu. "· Tr2.nsport Indeonit·.· 
341 F.:'d 514 (8th Cir. 1965); llational t1utual Insurance Co. v. 
Libert•r riutual Co., 196 F.'.'d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Carolina Ca: 
Ins. Co. v. PenEs·!lvJnia Threshernan and Farners llutuJl Casual· 
Ins. Co. 3'.'7 F.2d (3d Cir. 1964); \ielloan v. Libertv :iuttei 
Ins. Co., 496 F.2d 191 (3th Cir. 1974); a'1d Carolina Casualtv 
:ns. Co. o:': :Jorc:h Aocrica, 595 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1979). 
Respondent argues that based on the facts of the pres. 
case, the Transport Indel!lnitv case is not applicable. Even 11hc· 
lioited to its own facts, the Tr<insport case is not illustrati1-. 
the controlling L11J on this issue <ind does not hold up under ca· 
analysis. 
The Arizona Suprcoe Cou-::-t based its holdircg, in 
on two rationale. First, it held that even assuoin8 arguendo • 
I.C.C. regulario.-is 2r-e lioi ted in their ef[cct to disputes bet'. 1 
the lessee and oenbers of the public, the lessee's policy is a1 
by an endorsement attached to the policy. 1he Court stated: 
6 
... The transport policy contains an 
e;>d,,r' ooe:c t pr-o,·id i:cg that the body of 
the puliC'' (llhich contair_s the ezcess-
other :_nsura'.',ce clause) ':!..s hE:rebv 
amended' so that '. .no condition, 
provis:_on, stipulation, or linitation 
contained in the ... policy ... 
shall relieve [Transport] froo liabilit" 
hereunder or froo paynent of any final · 
judgocnt . . '. at 
,,1,· cc1Jorsccent referrec to is required by I.C.C. regulations, so in 
the Arizona Court argued that even if i.C.C. regulations do 
l:_nit the policy provisions as to a dispute betueen insurers, 
I.C.C. endorsement attached to lessee's polic; does. In the 
preser1t case the endorseoent language quoted above was not part of 
the National policy, but only iopliec by the I.C.C. 
In Carolina Casualtv insurance Co. vs. Insurance Coopanu 
llorth Anerica, 595 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. lq]8), the Court discussed 
the sane issue and concluded: 
4 9 U. S . C. § 315 and 4 9 C. F. P,. § 10 4 3. 1 (a) , 
governing insurance and other assurances 
of motor carrier's financial responsibil-
ity, require only that the carrier give 
security to pay any final judgoent re-
covered against such ootor carrier . . ; 
they mention nothing about defense of 
actions and nothing about payoent of judg-
ments recovered against other parties such 
as lessors .... 11or does the I.C.C. en-
dorseoent operate to relieve the lessor 
or its insurer of any ultioate financial 
claios or judgoents 
against them._ ... 
Footnote 36: 
In the recent decision of Carolina 
Casu2lty Insurance Co. vs. Under11riters 
7 
Insur u n cc C 0 . 5 6 Si f . :' c'. J 0 , _ : ._ ( 5 t l 1 
Cir. t 
ing 2GouL tLc :.C.C. ·L. 
The purp()SC ('_,_- ,_•! L'.-,l_' 
Intc2.:":;tate £'.•::.t Jt.ll 
P-.egula_tions i:.; t,J tC' 
to ncob<crs o:L ::he ;)Ublic a11d 
shippers that a 
carrier has 
cial responsibili.t•.', 1:ith 
the dollar lioits 
to pay for losses created bv 
its carrier operations. On 
the face of the endorseoent 
this is accomplished by read-
out,' other. i::surance', 
excess , or sioilar 
insofar as the anount avail-
able to a third-partv victio 
would be reduced. But there 
is no need for or purpose to 
be served by this supposed 
autooatic extingui3hmert of 
the clause insofar as it 
effects the insured or other 
insurers who clanor £or part 
or 211 of the coverage. Id. 
at 139. 
The second rationale the Arizona Court adopted 11as th: 
even without the I.C.C. endorseoent, the intent of the Interstc'. 
Comoerce Act w2s to". .pen:1it the I.C.C. to abolish and regu. 
a wide range of practices 11hich had cone into e;;istence in the 
trucking industry by inposing 'responsibility-and-control regu-
lat ions' governing the regulation of non-m.JT,ed vehicles". 
65'.' P.2d at 143. The Court 11ent on to the conf.ressi(,c 
intent, apparently paraphrasing a U.S. Suprcce Court 
follovs: 
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Congressional intent included 'fi::ing' 
responsibility by adopting 
il rule or lau od:ing the lessee liable 
for anv negligent act of the driver, 
even though he wa.s enplo'red bv the 
lessor. It included re-
that the lessee give proof 
ot 11nancial responsibility for its 
liabilitv for the acts of the driver. 
It language preventing the 
insurer whose policv was filed as 
proof of financial responsibility 
(Transport in this case) froo reliev-
ing itself of its obligation to pay 
daoages. Transamerican Freightlines, 
Inc. v. Brada Miller, supra. 
(423 U.S. 28, 96 S.Ct. 229, 46 L.Ed.2d 
169 (1975)] li_,_ at 144. 
Respondent is unable to determine what portion of the 
Brada Miller opinion the Arizona Court paraphrased. In reference to 
the intent and purpose of the I.C.C. regulations, the United States 
Supreoe Court in the Brada Miller case did oake the following 
statement: 
After a detailed examination of the pro-
ceedings of the Comoission that resulted 
in the promulgation of the protective pro-
visions at issue in this case, the Court 
observed: 'The purpose of the rules is to 
protect the industry from practices detri-
mental to the maintenance of sound transpor-
tation services consistent with the regula-
tory system,' and to assure safety of the 
operation. (citations) 'So the rules in 
question are aimed at conditions which oay 
directly frustrate the success of the regu-
lation undertaken by Congress.' (citation) 
It is apparent, therefore, that the sound 
transportation services and the elimination 
of the probleo of a transfer of operating 
authority, with its attendant difficulties 
of enforcing safety requirements and of 
fixing financial responsibility for daoage 
and injuries to shippers and meobers of the 
9 
public, 1,vere the t d_:_i-1: "1<1! 
posts in the d c v c: t u [ th'" ,_ 
ru l c: s . 4 3 CS . G , 7 , 9 6 S . Ct . , _ ) '--! 
46 L.Ed.'.'d 160, (1')75) qu.Jli:1g 
Truck in? As.::; uc ia t iun s vs. l':1 it t'. 
344 C.S. 29(,, 73 S.Ct. 307, S7 L.t:u. 337 
(1953) (cnphasis c:cide<l). 
Fror.i this languci_ge appci_rentl;1, the i\rizoiw Suprene Court k 1s ;"" 
to the conclusion that congress the lessee's policy t1 
prir.iary as a oatter of law. The Court cit2s no 8uthorit;r, ot'. 1,: 
than the Brada tliller case to support its co;-iclusion. Incecd, t' 
Arizona Court acknouledges that the conclusion thev reach, citec 
Appellant's brief at 8, is the r.iinority view. 652 p. '.'d ci_t 143. 
Respondent asserts the Ilrada Miller cc:se c'oes not SUP?' 
the Arizona Supreme Cou:rt an2_l;rsis :wr does it suprcrt AppellcM' 
contention in the case. In tLe ililler opinion, t'oe 
U.S. Suprer.1e Court went no further than to state that ar.iong othE: 
considerations "fixing financial reSjJOnsibility for danages and 
injuries to shippers and oer.ibers of the public, were significant 
aios and guideposts in the developrnent of the cor.1prehensive rules 
423 U.S. at 37. In fact, the Court upheld an indennification 
provision that the lessor "save harmless" the lessee. The Court 
specifically pointed out that the lessee had defended and 
the underlying tort claim and then held: 
The [I.C.C.] regulations do ::ot e::press-
ly prohibit an inder:mificatinn provisi0:1 
in the agreenent between lessor and 
the lessee. In fact, thev neither sacctinn 
nor forbid it. It would to follow, 
then, that the I'.lere presence of a clause 
such as the one here - that the lessor 
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is to bear the burden of its o'm negli-
geTlce - do2s not, i:1 and o:': itself, 
?f fcnd the regulations so long as the 
.cssee does not absolve itself froo the 
auties to the public and to the shinpers 
j,._1220 sed upon it bv the Cooois s icm' s reg-
ulations 
Although one part•r is required by lm1 to 
have control and responsibilitv for con-
ditions of the vehicle, and to bear the 
consequences of any negligence, the party 
responsible in the law to the ir.jured or 
daoilged person oay seek indeonity froo 
the party responsible in fact. 423 V.S. 
at 39 and 40. (eophasis added) 
It is clear that the U.S. Supreoe Court the I.C.C. 
regulations as intended to provide a source of coopensation for 
sh'..!'pcrs ccnd injured thirc-po.rties in trip-lc:isc circu.-ist3nc12s. The 
Court does not hold or ioply, as the Transport Indemnit'' case 
suggests, that the registered ootor carrier's insurance provide 
absolute and exclusive primary coverage. 
The Brada lliller case suggests rather, that as long as the 
tort claioant is coopensated, valid provisions within the competing 
insurance policies will be given effect. As noted earlier, in the 
!_r_a.21sport Indeonity case, both insurers had refused to defend or 
settle the underlying tort claio at the tioe the Arizona Suprene 
Court heard the case. In an effort to prevent that very situation, 
thtc court o.dopted the policy "establishing a unifon:i rule fixinp, 
prir.io.ry financial responsibility for defense and payoent of clains 
in all cases involving trip leases". 652 P.2d at 144. The Court 
then lioited its holding: 
11 
\,le de) nut go s(_) ,1s t,_, t '.L 
;: c: de r l l (l T_,J i :--: p (- L' s u (' l I h I_ l ,_' ') "1 \ 
i1:.surt-r the (1f 
_,llI"-2 bt: ... 
up1..):: t:h: t1·::._-r"'·2-: 
or the s :i._11su::._·a::cc C\lnt:.:nct. 
(citation) there nav be 
f icCl.tion _ _:; bct•.-,'l:'Cf". th1; l_cssor, 
lessee (Jtl1er 
(citatiori) \:here th1..1 Se 
..... crhts m"v bt: 12-1 fc1rc:,c1 b·• ''C't"..; 011 
or. 
actions will not ordinarilv delav 
disposition of the tort bv- en-
forceocnt of the prioarv liability 
which lessee and insurer 
must bear. 652 P.2d at 145. 
In practice, houever, tht:: P.rizona Court's atteopt to 
provide a consistent, rule produces incocsistcnt results. 
applied to the facts of ti1c case, after the tort clain .:. 
been settled, the Arizona analysis, holding the lessee's 
prioary as a niltter of lau, has the effect of denying r.espondent' 
rights to indfilmification and contribution. A judicial fiat (h2: 
either policy is prioary vould render any contribution question · 
between Appellant's and Respondent's insured's noot. 
Respondent asserts the best reasoned authority and ana. 
sis is Carolina Casualtv Insurance Co. vs. Insurance Comcanv of 
North Aoerica, 595 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1978) (hereinafter IllA). 
that case the Third Circuit Court addressed the saoP issues as 
presented in the instant case and quote0 th<e Eanl' Lrnguuse ,-,-,,r, 
Brada Miller case that the Arizona Court quoted in the 
Inder.mity opinion, that "fixing financial responsibility for dar 
and injuries to . . oeobers of the public as one of the 
12 
i_ 01ns thc:: rules". 595 F. 2ci ;it 137. The Third 
, re ui l C,iu::t thc:n stJ.ted: 
\ie r:i;:iy o.ssuoe, 11ithout dcciding, that if 
Refrigero.ted, [lessee] as the holder of 
the I.C.C. peroit, were the onlv avail-
able defendant in this case, it- could 
not escape the significant duties of 
care and financial accountabj_lity to 
the public Hhich the Federal P.ules-;-and 
the contractual undertakings pursuant 
thereto, impose upon lessees. We oay 
also assume, without deciding, that 
IllA as Refrigeratecl's certified lia-
bility insurer could not absolve it-
self of a duty to nake the initial 
payoent of conpensation to an injured 
nember oi the public, in the event 
that neither Refrigeratecl nor any other 
party involved could answer financially 
for the danage. The District Court in. 
this action nav have intended to state 
nothing oore than the above two propo-
sitions when it declared that 'Refriger-
ated and l!JA . . are in that order 
primarily responsible for defending the 
Bab cocks' suit anc for paying any dao-
ages the Bab cocks night recover'. lie 
agree that these tuo principles are 
in accordance with the policy of this 
Court. 595 at 137. (enphasis added) 
In the INA case, the tort claio had been tried and the 
jury found no negligence on the part of the driver, but found both 
lessor and lessee independently liable for negligence. The Court 
then stated: 
Houover, the pleadings in this declara-
tory dCtion do not seek a determination 
of duty owed bv a notor-carrier lessee 
and its to.the injured public. 
Rather, we view this case in its present 
posture as an action to determine Hhere 
the ultimate finar.cial responsibility 
for the injury rests, after the injured 
13 
tu ll p .-1 r-:-- i L > 1. l t' 1 C ..- l' ·-; "1 , 11:"" i h l., ,__; 
'd 
ques-c:ic11: ::..:; thL' .. l. :L'. • 11: 
2ssuri:1c, c( r:1pL'Il::Ju.t:_,Jn [ l'L. 
public prc\·cr:t.:; chi' 
n.J;l:1e:: in which oL-
laws r,.;uuld OtherwiSt2 t:11_ 
financic:l burden uf th2 iniuc··1. S'JS 
at 137 & 138. - · 
In the J.ilA cn.se, counsel for tllc lessc"r, Carolin.::i 
Casualtv, presented the s&me argument as does Appellant 
the Third Circuit Court rcj ected as :'ollm1s: 
Carolina and Stanford appear to argue in 
this appeal that our court's 
should stop with consideration of. the 
!.C.C. regulations and the public policies 
serve the!"C:b". Cc \:hile a 
lessee free itscff its fcrlcrall? 
inposcd duties when protection of the · 
public is at stake, the federal require-
ments arc not so radically intrusive as 
to absolve lessors or their insurers 
of othen1ise existing oblig,itions under 
applicable state tort law doctrines or 
under contracts allocating financial 
risk among private parties. Thus, in a 
declaratorv action sinilar to this one, 
determining which of two insurers overl 
primary coverage for liability arising 
from a leased vehicle accident, this 
Court rejected the reasoning of a 
District Court which had relied solel" 
on the 'responsibility and control' -
regulations to impose liability exclu-
sivelv on the lessee's insurer. 
Insurance Co. vs. Libert? 
l1utua1 Insurance Co. , 
(3rd Cir. 1976). J:h<tt decision held 
that 11here the case is 'concerned 11i th 
the responsibilit:: as between insuraT'c" 
carriers,' and not \litli the federal 
p0licy of protecting the public, 'I.C.C. 
considerations arc not rleterninativc' 
and a court should consider the express 
terns oi the parties' contracts. Id. 
at 138. 
l cspundcnt has defended and settled the underlying tort 
',. i ,, Lr.r, present case. In its current posture this action is 
t muu;1r to an action for contribution and therefore on the 
r'. above, the coverage should be dcteroincd b:• 
the express terDs of the t110 policies. 
POH;T J:I 
UCDER GEt1ERALL Y ACCEPTED :!:tJSURANCE COtlSTRUCTIOtl 
PRillCIPLES' OCCIDEUTAL Flr,E Atm CASUALlY COt\PAt1Y 
IS THE PP.lliARY HlSURER HAVU1G UAi:ED I;ISH AS 
WSURED UtWEP, ITS POUCY, \!HILE THE GUARAUTY 
llATIOtiAL rnSURAllCE POLICY EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES BISEL. 
After all the snake of :.C.C. regulations and ?Olicy has 
\Jec::1 cleared awav, the only real issue in this case is which insur-
ancc policy covers Deloy Bisel, since llorwood' s liability if any, is 
onl" vic?.rious and therefore tlonwod' s insurer as subrogee would be 
entitled to succeed to Norwood's rights of indennification against 
or his insurer. 
The Occidental policy contains two clauses pertinent to 
Ll1is is Gue. The first is the definition of insured uhich provides 
coverage for the nal!1ed insured (Bisel) and "any person or org2.n-
legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual 
u;c> c•f the ;iutor.10bile is by the naoed insured ... ". (R. 7) The 
"Se Hauling Contract executed by Eisel and Non1ood legally grants 
.r-• .. :cnJd the right of use and control of the truck during the lease 
00riod paragraph 7; R. 37). Bisel, the nal!1ed insured, was 
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driving the truck t\h' tin<c ,,[ thL· 1c·cid<.:r•.r. 
polic: . 
The seCOl"'cd cl3USE.: in the IJUlicy pe:_-t:...rlt_; r 
the case is the 11 other under the Lc;ngh;iul 
Endorsener.t, uhich provides, 11 \:ith -r-espcc1: 1:::,1 211:' o.uton(1Li:.c (':· 
coLITTerc:.:11 type vhile ',,eased o:::- loaned tc any person or cr1:21 
izatio:-i, this insurance shall be c::cess ovc:::- ar.:1 other 
and collectible insurance". (R. 13) (enphasis ccdced) 
language, this clause operates to r:Jc:ke t 112 Occidental po lie.• c::c, 
1;,;ben there is other vclid and collectible insurJ.uce 0v2il.0':_ 
to the insu:ced. 
policy extends only e::ces=: :=or ccciclent \;hicb occe:-
while the desc:::-ibed ·;chicl2 is '-''ased to a cocnon c2rrier". 
lant gives no argunent on appeal that its polic:1 is c:ot 
collectible other than "the I.C.C. filing r.1and2.tes that the Gucr 
policy be prinary." (Appellant Brief c.t 7). 
The Guaranty policy c.lso contains an "ey:cess clause" i. 
its Truckmen' s Endorseoent which provides, "d. With respect to 1 
(2) (3) any non-01med autooohile, the insu::-:mce U'«C•. 
this endorsenent shall he excess over any valid and callee· 
ible insur2nce, vhethe:::- pr:!.narv, ey:cess or contii1gcnt, 
the insured." (R. '.'9). In construing such cocpcting e<cess cl 
Couch on Insurance stiltes: 
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111er2 an automobile liabilitv oolicv 
issued to the ovmer provided' that its 
w2s available to 
legally responsible :or its operation, 
but also provided that coverage should 
not to claims covered bv other 
valid insurance and the lessee' of the 
car carried insurance under another 
policy providing that such insurance 
should be merely the excess coverage 
over and above the valid and collect-
ible insurance taken out bv the mmer, 
such latter insurance is not 'other 
valid insurance' so as to affect the 
insurance taken out bv the mmer. 
(cases cited therein), Couch on 
Insurance 2d §62-91, Ettect ot Excess 
Insurance Contract, at 569. 
According to the "Couch" rule, the e:::cess clause in tt1e 
Cui'\r,mt•» t:ational policv renoves it from consic1.cration as "other 
valici and collectible insurance" u:-ider the Cccidentsl policy. Under 
this rule the Occidental policy would provide prioary coverage up to 
its limits and only then would the Guaranty llational policy provide 
coverage. 
The Guaranty policy also expressly excludes Bisel fron 
coverage under the Truckmen Endorsement: 
(b) Except with respect to the named 
insured or an employee thereof, but 
subject otherwise to the "persons 
insured" provision, the insurance 
does not cover as an insured an;r 
person or or any agent 
or employee thereat engaged in the 
business of transporting propertv 
by automobile for the named insured 
or for others under anv the follow-
ing conditio:1s; 1) .. · . , 2) . 
3) . . . , 4) . . . provided, hm1ever, 
the driver or other person furnished 
to the named insured >1ith an autorr.obil2 
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hired b·: t 11,, ;1,,r:leLl L.LJ 
deencU :-tllt tu :-iL' an t 
n'-.lncd - \ : .. 
furni3hed with a hired auton0bile. Sisel is not tn 
enployee and is r1ot ilD insureJ. 
insured either expressly or 
According to the express provisions of the Guarant" 
National policy Bisel is not covered as an insured, therefore, 
Guaranty national policy is not valid and collectible insuraace 
to Bisel Jnd the Occidental excess clause c&nnot operate to dew 
coverage to Ei0c: for his l:'.__2bility arisi7'lg fror.i the accident oi 
July 17, 1978. Even if the Court uere to find the excess c 
both Trucknen Endorseoents as nutually repugnant and void, the 
Occidental policy rcnains the only policy covering Bisel as an 
insured and by reason of the oonibus clause in the Occidental r 
naming llorwood as an insured, Occidental is :::he prinary insurer 
This is the conclusion reached by the Tenth Circuit ,, 
Carolina Casualtv Coopany vs. Trilnsport Indeonit•r Conpanv, 
488 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1970). There the facts were the sane 
the instant case e;:cep t both po 1 ic ie s contained I. C. C. endorsec:c 
The Court looked be:'ond the 1.C.C. endorser;-,ents and be,,onJ the 
provisions to the insurance contracts thensclves and held the 
lessor's onnibus clause covered both the lessee nutor carrier• 
driver who \Jas an employee or the lessor and spccic:l eopluycc 
clic lc_·:_,scc.:' s pu:_icy contained no omnibus clause, and it 
t', ,.:ic·.; the lessee. The Court further held: 
r:o cJ.ses fro1_i this c2-rcuit or froo 
Ctah appear to be to the contrarv. 
Ringsby (lessee) had full control 
over the truck, tractor and trailer, 
and over Freeze (driver and lessor's 
ernplovee). Ringsby's liability, if 
aLy, is vicarious. If Ringsbv should 
be found liable it would have the 
rieh t to proceed by iI1deonif ica t ion 
against Freeze. As subro-
gee, Trw1sport could then sue 
a peroissive user UC'.der Carolina's 
policy, ultimately recovering against 
Carolina. Pased on the above and to 
avoid circuity action, ue hold 
Carolina's policy (the lessor's policy) 
to be prioary. 794. 
T11c saoc would be consistent in the insta1.1t case 
: i the Court 11cre to look beyond the I. C. C. endorsement. To hold 
u:herwise uould have the effect of transferring the risk that 
Occidental specifically contracted to insure over to Guaranty 
National Insurance Company 1fuich specifically contracted to exclude 
just such risk. 
CONCLUSIOtl 
Based on the majority position illustrated by the Carolina 
Casuaiy vs. Insurance Cor10an'1 of Uorth Anerica analysis adopted by 
tr,e Thic-d Circuit, an I.C.C. endorscoent is not deteroinative of 
p<llicv u'vc:rage as between tuo insurance coopanies, \Jhen the 
obligation to oDke a third-party whole has been satisfied. Federal 
19 
the parties contrc1.ct. f-_;r vi1:'11 1 
insurance contracts thcr.iselvcs. 
Fire and Casualty Cor.ipany' s policv, covering Eisel o.s n,<r.iec'. ir_,,,_ 
and Horwood Tr:msportation as insuYed under tlw or.riihus cLmsc: 
prir.iary as opposed to the Guc;rantv tlational insuriL1Ce polic:r iii-.:. 
covers only Transportation and is excess. 
The plaintiff-Respondent respectrully subr.iits thc.t tr,, 
Third District Court w2s correct in its holding ar.d should the:,,· 
be af'.::irned. 
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